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Abstract
This paper investigates the reasons why ¯rms use ¯xed-term contracts. Two distinctive
features of these contracts - reduced ¯ring costs and the prohibition of contract rollover - are
highlighted. Firms' decisions related to temporary contracts - the choice of the contract on
o®er and contract conversion - are modeled within standard adjustment costs and matching
settings. Regression analysis is performed on the stock of ¯xed-term contracts and the
°ows of temporary workers to permanent positions. Results from a beta-binomial regression
model indicate that screening workers for permanent positions is the single most important
reason why ¯rms use this type of contract.
Keywords: Fixed-Term Contracts, Adjustment Costs, Temporary Employ-
ment
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In virtually all labor markets, deregulation was the policy response to high and
persistent unemployment. In Europe, many countries adopted two-tier reforms
that, while increasing °exibility at the margin, left unchanged mandates applying
to already existing contracts. As a result, new contractual arrangements governed
by less stringent rules, particularly as regarded ¯ring costs, were introduced. Sub-
sequently, some of these new forms of contract rapidly gained importance. In the
U.S.A., where no similar rigidities could be found, it was also the case that new
forms of work also developed.
Rationalization of the growing share of these work arrangements has been of-
fered within an adjustment cost framework. In this context, ¯rms hire contingent
workers because they want to save on future dismissal costs, independently of their
origin. Notwithstanding, the focus on adjustment costs alone may be too narrow.
Recent studies dispute the common view that ¯xed-term contracts actually o®er
¯rms increased °exibility due to restrictions that typically apply to the rolling
over of these contracts (Hunt, 2000; Maurin, 2000). Besides, there are a number of
reasons other than saving on prospective ¯ring costs that may make ¯rms willing
to use ¯xed-term contracts:
² First, temporary workers may be preferred because they may be less costly
to employ.
² Second, ¯xed-term contracts, like other temporary contractual types, are pre-
ferred alternatives when temporary or temporarily vacant positions are being
¯lled. This is partly what these types of contracts were designed for.
² Third, if there is uncertainty about the value of the match, ¯xed-term con-
tracts may serve as screening devices. If a job match is a pure experience
good, its true value is revealed only after the match is formed. When the
information about the true value of the match arrives, the match will be
classi¯ed as good or bad depending on how its true value compares to the
1¯rm's reservation value. Accordingly, the match is either maintained or ter-
minated. If match destruction is optimal the ¯ring cost will be borne. Hence,
in contexts like this, ¯rms may ¯nd it optimal to hire workers on temporary
contracts for a trial period, and at a latter stage either o®er them a permanent
contract or dismiss them.
² Fourth, independently of any of the reasons above, using ¯xed-term contracts
to ¯ll permanent positions may be part of the ¯rm's personnel policy.
Churning, that is worker turnover in excess of job turnover, has been previously
reported as a permanent feature of some ¯rms' employment records and not only
the inevitable response to unfortunate mismatches (Burgess et al., 2000). Such
policies may be rationalized within an e±ciency wage framework where ¯rms are
thought of as choosing di®erent combinations of wages and turnover at continuing
positions. Firms choose one type of strategy over the other depending on the
fundamentals of their technology, skills, and cost structure. Costly monitoring
and training are likely to be associated with a high wage - low turnover strategy,
as are higher average skill level and more e±cient hiring technologies (Lane et al.,
1996).
Churning strategies may also be rationalized within a simple adjustment cost
framework. Because the cost of ¯ring one worker with a temporary contract is
reduced, ¯rms may be more willing to hire new workers and examine them on
the job. But because of non-renewal clauses, ¯rms may prefer to ¯re the worker
while his contract is temporary and take a chance with a new one (Blanchard and
Landier, 2002). The result is persistent match destruction at continuing positions,
i.e., churning.
To understand the reasons why employers use ¯xed-term contracts is important
because they shape their consequences for the economy at large. The implications
of ¯xed-term contracts for long-term productivity growth depend crucially upon
the reasons why employers use them.
If ¯xed-term contracts are used as bu®er stocks, implications are mixed. Flexi-
2ble contracts facilitate ¯ring in downturns, reducing labor hoarding and fostering
productivity. But, because they reduce job stability, the use of ¯xed-term contracts
as bu®er stocks also hinders match-speci¯c learning-by-doing and investments in
training, and harms long-run growth prospects.
On the contrary, if ¯xed-term contracts are used as screening devices, they
generate better growth prospects due to better learning about match quality, which
translates into better job matches and, therefore, more stable employer-employee
relationships (Nagyp¶ al, 2001).
Finally, if ¯xed-term contracts are used for churning workers they unequivocally
have adverse e®ects in terms of productivity growth, again because they reduce
match-speci¯c learning-by-doing and investments in training, and because more,
otherwise good, matches are terminated and replaced with new ones of an uncertain
value (Blanchard and Landier, 2002).
Assessing the role ¯xed-term contracts play in employers' sta±ng policies is
essentially an empirical problem for which only limited evidence is available. Typ-
ically, studies that address this issue do it from the employee's perspective, using
data from national Labor Force Surveys to compute transitions in and out of
temporary employment.
The results available for Italy (Adam and Canziani, 1998), France (Abowd et
al., 1999), and the United Kingdom (Booth et al., 2002), all indicate that ¯xed-
term contracts are stepping stones to permanent forms of employment rather than
dead-end jobs. This is consistent with the hypothesis that ¯xed-term contracts
are a mechanism of screening workers for permanent positions more than they are
bu®er-stocks or instruments of churning policies, which would lead instead to labor
market segmentation.
However, all studies that use Spanish data (Alba-Ramirez, 1998; Adam and
Canziani, 1998; Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000; Guell and Petrongolo, 2003), indicate
the contrary. In Spain ¯xed-term contracts seem to be very much a vehicle of labor
market segmentation: employment with ¯xed-term contracts is largely involuntary,
less well paid, and o®ers limited advancement opportunities.
3In the U.S. labor market, temporary forms of work, which include part-time
work, temporary agency employment, independent contracts, and short-term hir-
ings, are mostly used to accommodate workload °uctuations and to ¯ll temporarily
vacant positions, although, some employers report using °exible forms of employ-
ment to screen workers for regular positions (Autor, 2001, Houseman, 2001).
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the reasons why ¯xed-term contracts
are used in the Portuguese labor market, and derive policy implications there
from. The Portuguese labor market institutional framework provides an interesting
setting for studying ¯xed-term contracts for two reasons: ¯rst, because it is an
extreme case of high ¯ring costs (acccording to a recent OECD study (OECD,
1999), Portugal ranks ¯rst in the stringency of employment protection legislation);
and second, because the access to detailed longitudinal employer information about
worker °ows, gives a unique opportunity to investigate the conversion of temporary
contracts into open-ended contracts.1
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie°y states the theoretical back-
ground. Section 3 gives an overview on the role of ¯xed-term contracts in the
Portuguese labor market. Section 4 describes the two empirical models used in
regression analysis. Section 5 describes the data used in the article. In Section
6, the pro¯le of ¯xed-term contract users is described and the determinants of
contract conversion are investigated. Section 7 concludes.
2 A Simple Theoretical Framework
Think of a ¯rm as a collection of jobs. At time t0 the ¯rm creates n new per-
manent positions. Permanent positions live for two periods indexed by T =1 ;2.
Permanent and temporary workers alike can ¯ll permanent positions. Permanent
workers enjoy high job security, temporary workers do not. The di®erence between
the two types of workers is captured by the corresponding ¯ring costs Áf, indexed
by superscript i = H;L where H and L indicate high and low ¯ring cost contracts,
1To the best of our knowledge, this is the ¯rst study that looks at transitions from ¯xed-term to open-ended
contracts, using employer survey data, which - as in any labor demand empirical research - is the best we can aim
for.
4respectively.
For employers, the problem of ¯lling a vacancy is one of optimally assigning to
jobs workers who are observationally equivalent but have di®erent productivity on
the job.
Information about the true value of the match is revealed at the end of the ¯rst
period, denoted t1. For simplicity, it is assumed that all separations are initiated
by the ¯rm (i.e., there are no voluntary quits). All workers hired at t0 stay with
the ¯rm until t1. At this point in time, those that do not meet the critical match
value set by the ¯rm will be ¯red. Because permanent workers are more costly
to dismiss, they enter the ¯rm through a more demanding pre-hiring screening
process. Hence, costs of hiring a permanent worker (ÁH
h ) exceed those of hiring
a temporary worker (ÁL
h). Thinking of a worker's productivity on the job as the
realization of a random variable y drawn from a distribution that is speci¯c to each
type of contract (because hiring for permanent contracts are associated with more
pre-hiring screening), implies that the mean value of the productivity of a worker
hired as permanent is higher than is that of a newly-hired temporary worker. Let
f(y)i denote the probability density of y and the superscprit i the type of contract














Wages are determined by bargaining between the ¯rm and the worker and are not
contingent on the output produced by the match (which is information private to
the ¯rm), or on the utility it delivers (which is information private to the worker).
All workers are paid the same wage regardless of the type of contract they are
o®ered. 2 De¯ne the productivity value of a match, V (y), as the present value of






2The assumption that all workers are paid the same wage is not essential. Alternatively, we could assume that
in period 1, workers with permanent contracts receive higher wages because their expected productivity is higher.
In period 2, wages depend on the individual-speci¯c productivity. Nothing essential in the results depends on
this.
5where ½ is the discount factor.
De¯ne also the total productivity match value, V 0(y), as the V (y)l e s st h e










where Áf denotes ¯ring costs.
2.1 The choice of the type of contract
The condition for a worker to be hired with a permanent contract is that the total
expected productivity value of a permanent match net of the corresponding hiring



























Condition 5 simply states that in forward looking ¯rms the expected productivity
of a permanent match must be high enough to compensate, over its survival period,
the additional hiring costs and ¯ring costs they imply relative to those incurred if
the match were formed as temporary.
2.2 The decision to keep/replace permanent matches
By assumption, the true value of the match is revealed to the ¯rm at time t1.A t
this time, a decision must be made as to maintining or destroying the permanent
match. Permanent matches are optimally maintained if their true total produc-
tivity value exceeds the expected productivity value of replacing the match in the
second period, net of the costs of match replacement. Assuming that productiv-
ity is constant throughout the entire two periods, condition (5) will hold in each
period. This implies that permanent workers will necessarily be replaced with
permanent workers. In this case, match replacement is optimum if:








Condition 6 illustrates the fact that adjustment costs insulate incumbent work-
ers from the competition of outsiders.
2.3 The decision to keep/replace temporary matches
If at time t0 workers were hired as temporary, at time t1 employers still have to
decide whether to keep the match or replace it with a similar one. If conversion
clauses do not apply, this decision is essentially the same as in the case of per-
manent workers. However, if conversion clauses apply, employers must take into
account that if keeping the match, this must become permanent. Match conver-
sion implies the immeadiate destruction of match value because of the increase in
the cost of ¯ring the worker in the future if his contract becomes permanent today.
The condition for optimal conversion of a temporary contract into a permanent
one is:













Condition 7 implies that, for a certain expected productivity value of a new
temporary match, replacement of temporary matches is more likely if the costs of
replacing a temporary match (the costs of hiring and ¯ring a temporary worker) are
low and the relative costs of ¯ring a permanent worker are high. In labor markets
characterized by such conditions, employers feel more tempted to ¯re temporary
workers and try their luck with similar replacement matches of an uncertain value.
As a result, unproductive churning is more important in those settings.
3 Two empirical models
To discriminate empirically between the competing reasons why employers may
choose to employ their workforce with ¯xed-term contracts we employed two re-
gression models.
7The ¯rst model focuses on the employer's decision to o®er a ¯xed-term contract
as an alternative to standard (open-ended) contracts. The dependent variable is
the number of individuals employed with a ¯xed-term contract (the number of
events) out of the total number of employees at the ¯rm (the number of trials). In
these circumstances a count model applied to proportions (of which the Poisson
regression model is the most commonly assumed) is often used. The same kind
of speci¯cation would also be indicated for the second regression model where the
dependent variable is the number of ¯xed-term contracts that were converted to
permanent (the number of events) out of the total of ¯xed-term contracts existing
at the ¯rm (the number of trials).
However, if data display overdispersion, the Poisson assumption will fail and
generalized count models generated by mixtures are more adequate. Unobserved
heterogeneity or true contagion, both may generate overdispersed data, which is, in
fact, a common feature of count data. One way overdispersion may be manifested
is through a higher relative frequency of ze r oo b s e r v a t i o n st h a ni sc o n s i s t e n tw i t h
the Poisson assumption.3
In these circumstances, the count data models more commonly used in applied
work are negative binomial models that may be interpreted as a Poisson-gamma
mixture, which can be viewed as a Poisson distribution with unobserved individual
(gamma) heterogeneity, but that also allows for particular forms of dependence for
the underlying stochastic process (true contagion). The problem with the negative
binomial speci¯cation is that it assumes an in¯nite upper bound for the variate
of interest, which makes it inappropriate if it is small, as is the case with the
dependent variables of the two regression models being studied.
In these cases, a beta-binomial model is a useful alternative. This model has







but assumes that the probability p that the event occurs in any of its n trials
3Hurdle models are sometimes used to deal with this feature of the data, which is commonly referred to as
"excess zeros" or "zero in°ation".
8depends on a set of unobserved individual characteristics, and that it is distributed
as a beta random variable with parameters ® and µ. Under these assumptions,

























(µ + 1)(1 + µ + ®µ)
(11)
Assuming ® is a constant and µ depends on x exponentially according to µ =
exp(x0¯), it is clear that the marginal e®ects of the explanatory variables are

















n = ¯jp(1 ¡ p)n (12)
meaning that the coe±cients on dummy explanatory variables can be interpreted
as odds ratios.





























































This beta-binomial regression model stands for the binomial in very much the
same way that the negative binomial model stands for the Poisson. This means
that it may still be interpreted as a binomial distribution with individual hetero-
geneity, but also as giving the number of successes when both success and failure
are contagious.5 The accommodation of true contagion is an welcome feature of
4See Santos Silva and Murteira (2000).
5The estimation procedure automatically weights each observation by the corresponding risk set. That is,
in the incidence of ¯xed-term contracts equation, the observations are (implicitly) weighted by the number of
employees. In the transition to permanent employment equation the observations are weigthed by the number of
workers under ¯xed-term contracts.
9this distribution because the dependent variables in the two models described be-
fore may display that property. In fact, if one ¯rm uses ¯xed-term contracts as a
structural component of its sta±ng policy, the occurrence of an event increases the
probability of further occurrences and conversely. Likewise, in the second model,
if ¯rms use ¯xed-term contracts as part of a strategy of churning workers around
a ¯xed number of positions, failure to convert one contract into a permanent one
increases the probability of further failures in the same way that using ¯xed-term
contracts as screening devices implies that success is also contagious.
4D a t a
The data used throughout this article comes from the Social Audit (Balan» co Social)
which is an annual survey run by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment. When
it was ¯rst introduced in 1986 it covered state-owned ¯rms only. Since then its
coverage has expanded, ¯rst to ¯rms with at least 500 employees and, since 1992,
to ¯rms with at least 100 employees. For these ¯rms, answering the survey is
mandatory.
Each year, a respondent establishment reports data on a large variety of topics
concerning the characteristics of the workforce and labor costs. This is organized
into six major areas: (i) company details; (ii) employment; (iii) labor costs; (iv)
occupational safety; (v) vocational training; and (vi) social expenditures.
The employment block, which is the largest component of the survey, collects
detailed information on the characteristics of the ¯rm's workforce. This includes
the total number of workers (year average and end-of-year count), including the
skill composition, age structure, tenure, and the educational level of the workforce.
Total employment is also decomposed by type of contract.
Extensive information on the stock and °ows of workers with ¯xed-term con-
tracts is also available. Reasons why permanent workers left the ¯rm during the
course of each calendar year are also reported. The bulk of data used in the present
work comes from this block. Other data used below refer to wages (wage level and
wage dispersion), costs of vocational training, and other social expenditures.
10Four waves of the survey were available to this study, covering the period from
1993 to 1996. The sample we used contains information on 8 121 year*¯rms and
a total of 3.1 million workers.
The Social Audit provides complete information that enables us to identify the
share of ¯xed-term contracts in total employment and the proportion of ¯xed-term
contracts that were converted to permanent ones during the calendar year.
The stock measure of ¯xed-term contracts was obtained using the total number
of such contracts reported by respondents, which is referred to the year-end (head
count on December 31st). For consistency, the corresponding count of the total
number of employees was used, instead of the year average, which is also reported.
However, using the year-end count of ¯xed-term contracts to compute the cor-
responding rate of conversion would be inappropriate. Hence, the total number of
such contracts that existed during the calendar year and the number that during
t h es a m ep e r i o db e c a m ep e r m a n e n tw e r eu s e d .
The sole measure of wages reported is the ¯rm-level average for its entire work-
force excluding top-level managers. Because average wages of temporary and per-
manent workers are not available separately, the wage variable used in regression
simply tells us if ¯rms are high or low-wage ¯rms, giving us no information on
the relative wage of temporary and permanent workers. The wage variable is,
however, complemented with a measure of wage dispersion computed as the ratio
between the wages corresponding to the ¯rm's 95th percentile and the 5th. This
is intended to serve as a proxy for union strength at the ¯rm, as stronger unions
are associated with reduced wage dispersion.
Data on other human capital variables are available and were used. Firms are
asked about the year's total expenditure on training but there are no data on
the type of training, whether up-front or other. Hence, the corresponding per
capita measure (computed by dividing by the ¯rm's total workforce) is used. The
same holds true for the ¯rm's expenditure with fringe bene¯ts o®ered to their
employees, which include ¯rm-provided social insurance and other subsidies, as
well as expenditures with group-facilities.
11Separations of permanent workers are also reported, as well as the corresponding
reasons. Those not initiated by the ¯rm (voluntary quits and separations due to
retirement or death) are indirect evidence of the number of permanent positions
open at the ¯rm and are also used in estimation.
5 Fixed-Term Contracts in the Portuguese Labor Market
In the Portuguese labor market, between 1991 and 1998, ¯xed-term contracts
represented, on average, 14 percent of total employment. The two employment
surveys (the employer based - IEE -, and the household based - IE), despite their
















































































Figure 1: Incidence of Fixed-Term Contracts
The incidence of ¯xed-term contracts varies dramatically across occupational
categories. Temporary contracts account for only 4 percent of total employment of
managers, but this share varies inversely with the skill-level, reaching 68 percent
for apprentices at the lower-end of the scale. This pattern of variation of the
incidence of ¯xed-term contracts across skill-levels indicates that ¯rms use sta±ng
policies that di®er enormously across occupational categories. At the top of the
occupational scale, workers are either recruited as permanent or they are o®ered
an open-ended contract after a short trial period. For lower-skill levels, individuals
are predominantly hired under ¯xed-term contracts, which, on average, have longer
12duration. This has an obvious adjustment cost interpretation as hiring and training
costs are known to increase with the skill-level (Oi, 1962).
Stock measures of the share of ¯xed-term contracts are known to understate
their true importance (Houseman, 2001), which is more accurately measured by
the proportion of ¯xed-term contracts in employment °ows (i.e., accessions and
separations).6 On average, ¯xed-term contracts account for 62 percent of all ac-








































































































Figure 2: Proportion of Fixed-Term Contracts on Total Accessions
Quarterly measures of job and worker turnover indicate very di®erent patterns
of employment adjustment for permanent and temporary workers. Temporary
positions are highly volatile and temporary employment is highly unstable. The
average turnover rate of jobs ¯lled by temporary workers is 21.7 percent, indicat-
ing that, on average, every quarter about one out of ¯ve temporary positions is
either created or destroyed (see Table 1).7 The worker turnover rate of temporary
workers is 30.6 percent, implying that about one in three workers with a ¯xed-
term contract either joins or leaves his employer every quarter. The corresponding
ratios for permanent contracts are one in twenty-¯ve (for jobs) and one in twenty
(for workers). These results indicate very clearly that workers with ¯xed-term
6For larger ¯rms (100 employees or more) point-in-time measures capture, in Portugal, only 54 percent of
the total number of individuals with ¯xed-term contracts at any point within the corresponding calendar year.
Houseman (2001) ¯nds a similar result but with a di®erence of degree - instead of a two-to-one ratio she ¯nds a
¯ve-to-one for short-term hiring in the United States. Although not strictly comparable, these ¯gures indicate a
longer average duration of temporary contracts in Portugal.
7There is also an indication that quarterly worker turnover rates do not exceed by much job turnover rates.
See also Blanchard and Portugal (2001).







































































































Figure 3: Proportion of Fixed-Term Contracts on Total Separations.
Job and Worker Turnover
Job Job Job Hiring Separation Worker
Creation Destruction Turnover Rate Rate Turnover
All Workers 2.3 3.1 5.4 4.0 4.8 8.9
Permanent 1.9 2.6 4.6 1.9 3.2 5.1
Temporary 9.8 12.0 21.7 16.4 14.2 30.6
Table 1: Job Turnover and Worker Turnover, by Type of Contract. Source: IEE.
All job and worker turnover measures were computed using the methodology of Davis
et al. (1996).
6 Estimation results
6.1 The pro¯le of ¯xed-term contract users
As mentioned before, our strategy was to estimate a regression model where the
dependent variable (Y) is the number of ¯xed-term contracts existing at each ¯rm.
n is total number of employees at the ¯rm, which also constitutes an upper bound
on the number of ¯xed-term contracts the ¯rm may o®er at any time. p is the
probability that the ¯rm o®ers a ¯xed-term contract to any of its n employees. ®
and µ are the parameters of the distribution of p, which is beta-distributed. x is
a set of characteristics of the ¯rm and its workforce.
8Similar results are also available for Spain (Salvador and Dolado, 1995, Serrano, 1998) and Sweden (Arai
and Heyman, 1999). The two Spanish studies, which use di®erent types of data, indicate that the turnover of
positions ¯lled with temporary contracts is ¯ve-to-ten times larger than the corresponding measure for permanent
contracts. The Swedish study indicates a ¯ve-to-one relationship.
14The main variables of interest in vector x are wages, fringe bene¯ts, training
costs and tenure. Controls for the age and size of the ¯rm and the age and
quali¯cation pro¯le of its workforce are included in the regression. Industry and
year dummy variables were also included. Since tenure plays a pivotal role, the
model is estimated with and without the corresponding control. Speci¯cation
A in the ¯rst column of Table 2 does not control for tenure. A set of dummy
variables corresponding to the proportion of the ¯rm's workforce in di®erent tenure
intervals (less than two years, between two and ¯ve years, and more than ¯ve years
- omitted) is included in speci¯cation B. An interaction between the proportion of
employees with shorter tenure and training costs is further included in speci¯cation
C.
The wage variable included in the set of regressors is the log of the average wage
per worker computed at the ¯rm level. This average is computed by dividing the
total annual wage bill of the ¯rm by the head count. In this measure, all salaried
workers (and their wages) independently of the type of contract are included.
The estimate of the coe±cient of the wage variable in all the three speci¯cations
reported is positive and statistically signi¯cant, indicating that high-wage ¯rms use
¯xed-term contracts more intensively. The estimated marginal e®ects in Table 3
indicate that a 10 percent change in the ¯rm average wages generates an increase
of 0.17 (column 1) to 0.35 (column 3) percentage points in the probability of a
worker having a ¯xed-term contract. A positive sign for the wage variable may
indicate that employers predominantly choose a high wage - low churning strategy,
and therefore use fewer temporary workers when, controlling for quali¯cations and
other relevant characteristics of the workforce, they pay higher wages. However, a
compensating di®erential interpretation is also warranted by this result if ¯rms that
employ temporary workers must compensate them for the reduced job security they
are o®ered (Hamermesh and Wolfe, 1990). Notwithstanding, such interpretation
is weakened by the fact that the wage variable used in the regression measures
average wages paid to the ¯rm's entire workforce and not only to its temporary
workers.
15Consistent with a human capital interpretation, our results also indicate that
the least intensive users of ¯xed-term contracts are those ¯rms that pay higher
fringe bene¯ts and invest more in training.9
Of all the parameters of interest, the coe±cient of the training variable is the
most sensitive to the inclusion of the control for the tenure structure of the ¯rm's
workforce, changing from not statistically signi¯cant at the 10 percent level to
signi¯cant at 1 percent when the control for tenure is included.10 What this result
tells us is that, conditional on the tenure structure of the workforce, the ¯rms that
invest less in training are also the ones that use more ¯xed-term contracts.
The remaining results permit us to picture a more complete pro¯le of the ¯rms
that use ¯xed-term contracts more intensively - they are smaller (between 100 and
500 employees) and younger ¯rms, employing a greater share of younger and less
quali¯ed workers. The estimates obtained for the industry dummies de¯ned at
the 1-digit SIC level (not reported) indicate that ¯rms in construction, and trade,
restaurants and hotels are those that employ the greatest proportion of workers
with ¯xed-term contracts.11
6.2 The conversion of ¯xed-term contracts to permanent contracts
In the second regression model the dependent variable Y is de¯ned as the number
of ¯xed-term contracts in the ¯rm that during the calendar year were converted
to permanent. In this equation the number of trials n is the total number of
¯xed-term contracts that existed at the ¯rm over the same period of time.
9The variable Fringe Bene¯ts measures the ¯rms total expenditure on items such as private social security
plans, recreational activities for employees, assistance to student employees and others divided by the ¯rm's total
number of workers. The variable Training Costs is the ¯rm's average investment in formal training per worker.
10Note that the marginal e®ect of the tenure variable has to be interpreted as follows: a one percentage point
increase in the proportion workers with less than two years of tenure increases by 0.9 percentage points the
proportion of of ¯xed-term contracts (column 2 of Table 3)
11We also would like to include as regressors some measure of seasonal °uctuations of the ¯rm's workload as
well as some measure of the volatility of the demand for the ¯rm's output. That would permit a direct check of
the use of ¯xed-term contracts to insulate permanent workers from economic shocks (bu®er stocks). However, in
the Social Audit this kind of data is not present. Instead, we computed proxies of these two variables using a third
source that uses common ¯rm identi¯ers - the Inqu¶ erito ao Emprego Estruturado (IEE) and Personnel Records.
Seasonal °uctuations were proxied with a measure of quarterly employment variables around their annual average
over a 5-year period. To measure volatility we used the average deviation of the ¯rm's annual sales from the
corresponding 5-year average. Both these sources are plant-based implying that these variables are measured
with error. Although the estimates obtained for the corresponding coe±cients are signi¯cant and have the right




Log Wages 0.072** 0.147* 0.151*
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036)
Wage dispersion 0.010* 0.007* 0.007*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Fringe bene¯ts -0.149* -0.097* -0.099*
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
Training -0.136 -0.382* -0.182
(0.200) (0.090) (0.178)
Tenure 1 4.027* 4.059*
(0.083) (0.084)
Tenure 2 1.378* 1.374*
(0.096) (0.096)
Training * Tenure 1 -0.689**
(0.345)
Firm age
less than 2 years 0.006 -0.315* -0.315*
(0.074) (0.075) (0.075)
2-5y e a r s 0.177* -0.202* -0.200*
(0.060) (0.058) (0.058)
Firm size
500-999 employees -0.126** -0.052 -0.053
(0.051) (0.060) (0.060)
1000 employees or more -0.124** -0.114** -0.113***
(0.060) (0.063) (0.063)
Worker age
25-44 years -2.250* -0.600* -0.622*
(0.172) (0.169) (0.168)
45-64 years -3.712* -0.655* -0.671*
(0.137) (0.147) (0.147)
Constant 1.124* -2.410* -2.431*
(0.250) (0.260) (0.261)
Alpha 1.341* 1.021* 1.020*
(0.017) (0.013) (0.013)
Quali¯cation Level Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood -36881.8 -35860.1 -35857.4
Observations 7601 7601 7601
Table 2: Determinants of the Use of Fixed-Term Contracts. Standard errors in brackets.
*, **, *** denote statistical signi¯cance at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively .
The set of ¯rm characteristics is similar to that used in the previous section - we
control for wage levels and dispersion, training costs and bene¯t expenditures, the
¯rm's size and age, as well as for the age, quali¯cation and tenure structure of the
¯rm's workforce. All of the three speci¯cations include two additional variables
17Marginal E®ects
(A) (B) (C)
Log Wages 0.017 0.034 0.035
Wage dispersion 0.002 0.002 0.002
Fringe bene¯ts -0.034 -0.022 -0.023
Training -0.031 -0.088 -0.042
Tenure 1 0.932 0.939
Tenure 2 0.319 0.318
Training * Tenure 1 -0.159
Firm age
less than 2 years 0.001 -0.069 -0.069
2-5y e a r s 0.042 -0.045 -0.045
Firm size
5 0 0-9 9 9e m p l o y e e s -0.028 -0.012 -0.012
1000 employees or more -0.028 -0.026 -0.026
Worker age
25 - 44 years -0.518 -0.139 -0.144
45 - 64 years -0.854 -0.152 -0.155
Table 3: Marginal Effects from the Incidence of Fixed-Term Contracts Equation.
that measure the proportion of permanent workers that quit voluntarily (denoted
"quits") and the proportion of the permanent workforce that left the ¯rm due to
retirement or other "natural" causes, such as death (denoted "attrition"). Results
are reported in Table 3.
In all three speci¯cations the estimate of the coe±cient of wages (taken in
logarithmic form) is positive and statistically signi¯cant. The estimation results
indicate that a one percent increase in average wages increases between 0.181 and
0.213 percentage points the proportion of ¯xed-term contracts that are converted
to permanent (see Table 5). Put di®erently, high-wage ¯rms that (according to
results in the previous section) employ a greater share of temporary workers, also
o®er a permanent contract to a greater share of their temporary workforce.
In this equation, the wage dispersion variable has a negative sign, which is as
expected and further justi¯es its use as a proxy for union strength at the ¯rm level.
However, all the estimates are barely signi¯cant if at all.
The coe±cients of the two variables that capture the incidence of quits of per-
manent workers at the ¯rm level are positive and highly signi¯cant in all of the
estimated equations. This result indicates that the greater the proportion of sepa-
18Beta-Binomial Regression Model
(A) (B) (C)
Log Wages 0.226* 0.178* 0.189*
(0.048) (0.045) (0.046)
Wage dispersion -0.004*** -0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Fringe bene¯ts 0.065 0.041 0.052
(0.061) (0.061) (0.062)
Training -0.044 0.399* -0.426
(0.182) (0.143) (0.369)
Attrition 4.951* 4.440** 4.303**
(1.877) (1.845) (1.850)
Quits 1.187* 0.962* 0.995*
(0.318) (0.331) (0.331)
Tenure 1 -1.340* -1.399*
(0.096) (0.096)
Tenure 2 1.180* 1.210*
(0.146) (0.146)
Training * Tenure 1 1.650*
(0.484)
Firm age
less than 2 years -0.048 0.117 0.116
(0.112) (0.114) (0.114)
2-5y e a r s 0.058 -0.037 -0.058
(0.079) (0.081) (0.081)
Firm size
500-999 employees 0.006 -0.003 0.003
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
1000 or more employees -0.051 -0.056 -0.041
(0.080) (0.080) (0.080)
Worker age
25-44 years -0.088 -0.446** -0.452**
(0.197) (0.195) (0.195)
45-64 years -1.085* -1.302* -1.299*
(0.167) (0.188) (0.188)
Constant -3.744* -2.937* -3.065*
(0.345) (0.331) (0.345)
Alpha 1.697 1.618 1.615
(0.031) (0.030) (0.029)
Quali¯cation Level Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood -19857.0 -19733.9 -19729.1
Observations 7601 7601 7601
Table 4: Transitions to Open-Ended Contracts. Standard errors in brackets. *, **, ***
denote statistical signi¯cance at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively .
19Marginal E®ects
(A) (B) (C)
Log Wages 0.213 0.182 0.181
Wage dispersion -0.004 -0.002 -0.003
Fringe bene¯ts 0.061 0.042 0.050
Training -0.041 0.409 -0.409
Attrition 4.667 4.548 4.128
Quits 1.119 0.985 0.955
Tenure 1 -1.372 -1.342
Tenure 2 1.209 1.161
Training * Tenure 1 1.583
Firm age
less than 2 years -0.003 0.010 0.009
2-5y e a r s 0.004 -0.003 -0.004
Firm size
5 0 0-9 9 9e m p l o y e e s 0.000 -0.002 0.000
1000 employees or more -0.004 -0.004 -0.033
Worker age
25 - 44 years -0.083 -0.457 -0.434
45 - 64 years -1.023 -1.334 -1.246
Table 5: Marginal Effects from the Transitions to Open-Ended Contracts.
rations of permanent workers not initiated by the employers, the higher is the rate
of conversion of temporary contracts to permanent. These two variables provide us
with evidence on ¯rms' policies to manning permanent positions. Confronted with
the separation of one permanent worker, the ¯rm has three options - it may destroy
the corresponding position or hire a replacement worker either on a permanent or
on a temporary basis. The two latter alternatives are the ones of interest here. As
mentioned above, in the Portuguese labor market the majority of newly-admitted
workers are o®ered a temporary contract.
All the evidence available indicates that workers that start up on a new job
with a permanent contract since the very beginning occupy the most quali¯ed jobs.
For those hired with ¯xed-term contracts, the estimates obtained for the two quit
variables (voluntary and forced) indicate that they will eventually end-up receiving
a permanent contract. Put di®erently, what these results tell us is that ¯rms where
permanent positions open up typically hire temporary replacement workers and
screen them on the job. If the temporary match proves good enough, the worker
20receives a permanent position. If not, the temporary contract is terminated and
the recruitment process starts anew.
As in the equation for the number of ¯xed-term contracts, the result we ob-
tain for the coe±cient of the variable "Training" very much depends on whether
a control for tenure is present or not. Without controlling for tenure (speci¯ca-
tion A) the training coe±cient is small and negative, which is contrary to what
standard human capital theory would imply. A negative sign here indicates inter-
nal dualism where workers with ¯xed-term contracts are used as bu®er-stocks in
a modi¯ed insider-outsider mechanism. However, when the control for tenure is
included additively (speci¯cation B), the training coe±cient becomes positive and
statistically signi¯cant, indicating that ¯rms that invest more in the training of
their workforce are the ones that more frequently o®er them permanent contracts.
This is consistent with human capital theories. But if this positive nexus between
investments in training and the rate of conversion of ¯xed-term contracts can be
associated with training of newly-admitted workers, then it would also unequivo-
cally indicate that these temporary contracts are used for screening purposes. This
is a sizable e®ect, meaning that an increase of a 1 000 PTE (around ¯ve dollars) in
training expenditures (per worker) leads to an increase of 0.04 percentage points
in the conversion rate.
To further check on that result, an interaction term between training expendi-
tures and the proportion of employees with tenure less than two years was included
as a regressor in speci¯cation C. If positive, the corresponding coe±cient implies
that the positive e®ect of training expenditures is larger in ¯rms where low-tenured
workers account for a larger share of total employment. This is, in fact, what the
results show. The coe±cient estimate is positive - 1.650 - and highly signi¯cant
and the coe±cient of training becomes not signi¯cant and negative. We conclude
that the positive e®ect of training on the rate of conversion of temporary contracts
is due to a non-trivial component of training o®ered to newly-admitted temporary
workers.
The coe±cients of the two tenure variables representing, respectively, the pro-
21portion of the ¯rm's workforce with tenure less than two years and between two
and ¯ve years (tenure longer than ¯ve years being the omitted category) reveal an
interesting pattern. Firms with a larger share of low-tenured workers, presumably
those with a larger share of employees with ¯xed-term contracts, are the ones that
convert ¯xed-term contracts to permanent ones less frequently. This may simply
indicate that ¯rms wait until the maximum legal duration of ¯xed-term contracts
to convert them into open-ended contracts. But, this result can also indicate that,
for some ¯rms at least, churning may be a structural component of their sta±ng
policies. The estimates obtained for the set of industry dummies also indicate that
such use of ¯xed-term contracts may have a precisely de¯ned sectoral scope. The
two industries identi¯ed above as the most intensive users of ¯xed-term contracts
- construction and wholesale and retail trade and restaurants and hotels - are also
the ones that o®er fewer permanent contracts to their temporary workforce.
7 Conclusions
Recent research has produced evidence that shows that the actual impact of
¯xed-term contracts at both the macro and micro-levels is inconsistent with what
was previously expected. Aggregate employment adjustment is not signi¯cantly
speeded up when the use of ¯xed-term contracts is made easier (Hunt, 2000), and
unemployment may actually increase (Blanchard and Landier, 2002). Clauses pro-
hibiting the rolling over of temporary contracts were identi¯ed as the main reason
behind these results.
At the micro-level, clauses of non-renewal o®er yet another reason for ¯rms to
use ¯xed-term contracts - good temporary matches may be destroyed and replaced
by other similar matches of an uncertain value only to bypass the legal obligation
of converting ¯xed-term contracts into open-ended ones. Said another way, be-
cause ¯xed-term contracts cannot last inde¯nitely, ¯rms may be willing to adopt
personnel policies with a structural churning component.
Hence, an accurate description of the role of ¯xed-term contracts at the micro
(as well as at the macro-level) must take into account their two distinct features -
22reduced ¯ring costs and the prohibition of contract roll-over. This implies model-
ing the ¯rm's approach to ¯xed-term contracts as a combination of two decisions.
First, at hiring and ¯ring points, ¯rms must choose their preferred margin of ad-
justment - temporary or permanent. Second, for each temporary contract o®ered,
¯rms must at some point decide whether to convert it into a permanent form or
terminate it.
The empirical results show that screening is a major motivation for employing
workers with ¯xed-term contracts. A particularly strong result indicates that
training and ¯xed-term contracts are complements, which is consistent with recent
interpretations of training as an ability screen device. What our results indicate
is that ¯xed-term contracts may actually be playing a screening role similar to
what the temporary help supply industry reportedly plays in the U.S. (Autor,
2001). This result is reinforced by direct evidence on the magnitude of transition
rates from ¯xed-term to open-ended contracts, and is consistent with evidence
also reported for France (Abowd et al., 1999) and the U.K. (Booth et al., 2002).
Our ¯ndings do not support the hypothesis of ¯rms using ¯xed-term contracts as
part of churning strategies. This is consistent with previous ¯ndings that indicate
that, for workers, ¯xed-term contracts are more a port of entry to a permanent
employment than a short-term form of employment (Varej~ ao, 2003).
These results have important policy implications. To the extent that ¯xed-
term contracts are primarily a mechanism of screening workers for permanent
positions, they do not justify concerns over job insecurity and cannot be held
responsible for the development of segmented labor markets. On the contrary, as
a screening mechanism, ¯xed-term contracts may actually increase match quality
and, indirectly, job security.
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268 Appendix
8.1 Legislation on Dismissal and Fixed-Term Contracts
8.1.1 Dismissals of Workers with Open-ended Contracts
Rules governing the termination of permanent contracts in Portugal are widely
perceived as very restrictive, placing that country high in all international rank-
ings of labor market rigidities (OECD, 1999). Fixed-term contracts, which were
¯rst regulated in 1976, were conceived as an instrument of °exibilization at the
margin. The mushrooming of ¯xed-term contracts eventually led to major changes
in the legal framework governing both types of contracts in 1989, when most rules
currently in force were established.
Types of dismissal
Individual dismissal is permitted in case of an employee's culpable behavior,
employee's failure to adapt to changes in the nature of his work, and of redundancy.
Redundancies a®ecting more than one worker (¯rms with ¯fty workers or less) or
more than four (¯rms with more than ¯fty workers) become collective dismissal.
Notification
In all cases of individual dismissal, written communication of impending dis-
missal to the employee and to the works council and/or union is required. This
statement must give the reasons on which the dismissal is based. The worker and
his representatives are then given the opportunity to dispute the employer's alle-
gations. In case of economic redundancies, the worker may further ask for Labor
Inspectorate intervention, in which case o±cials have to verify the validity of the
arguments put forward by the employer. For all types of dismissal these procedures
take at least three weeks.
60-days advance noti¯cation of a collective dismissal to the works council or
union and to the Ministry of Employment is also required. Within 15 days consul-
tations between the three parties are mandatory. Alternatives to redundancy, the
number of dismissals, and ways to mitigate the e®ects of dismissal are all issues
that must be addressed during this consultation process. Once an agreement is
27reached, each worker selected for dismissal must be noti¯ed of the impending job
loss. This must be done at least 60 days before the date of dismissal. Otherwise,
the worker is entitled to the corresponding pay.
Severance Pay
In all cases of dismissal (except for disciplinary reasons) the worker is entitled
to a payment equal to one month of pay for each year of service, subject to a
minimum of three months of pay.
Unlawful dismissal
Only courts may declare a dismissal unlawful, mostly on the grounds of the
employer's failure to comply with dismissal mandatory procedures. Consequences
of such court decision are the employer being obliged to reinstate the worker in his
previous position and pay him an amount equal to what he would have received
from the time he was last paid to the moment the decision was made. The worker
may choose to quit, in which case he is entitled to an indemnity corresponding to
one-month pay for each year of service (subject to a 3-month minimum).
8.1.2 Dismissals of Workers with Fixed-Term Contracts
Valid cases
Fixed-term contracts are permitted for objective reasons (replacement of tem-
porarily absent permanent workers, exceptional workload, seasonal work, and spe-
ci¯c projects). They are also permitted for business start-ups, the launching of
new activities of uncertain duration, and recruiting the long-term unemployed and
those individuals looking for their ¯rst job.
Duration
Fixed-term contracts have a minimum duration of six months unless they are
justi¯ed on objective grounds, in which case no minimum applies. Their maximum
duration is set at three years (two in the cases of business start-ups and the launch-
ing of new activities). Three successive renewals are the maximum permitted.
Expiration
The contract expires only if the employer noti¯es the worker eight days in
28advance that he does not intend to renew it; otherwise it is automatically renewed.
If the maximum duration of the contract is exceeded, the contract automatically
becomes permanent.
Termination
When the end of a contract is reached and not converted into a permanent
contract, the worker is entitled to a terminal bonus equal to two days pay for each
complete month of the contract's elapsed duration.
If the employer terminates the contract before its term, and the termination
is unlawful, the worker is entitled to compensation equal to the pay loss from
dismissal to the date of the court's decision or the term of the contract (whichever
occurs ¯rst). He or she is also entitled to reinstatement if the term of the contract
has not yet been reached.
In the case of voluntary quits, the worker must notify the employer 30 days in
advance; 15 days if the duration of the contract is less than 6 months. Otherwise
the worker must pay the employer an indemnity equal to the pay corresponding
to the advance notice period.
Restrictions
If, during the period of the contract the ¯rm opens a vacancy for a permanent
position, workers with ¯xed-term contracts who may qualify for the job are given
priority over other applicants.
If, after an elapsed duration of 12 months, a contract is not renewed for reasons





Fixed-term contracts 127.38 331.33
Transitions to Open-ended 12.88 43.07
Log Wages 7.01 0.47
Wage dispersion 7.69 9.33




Tenure 1 0.25 0.22
Tenure 2 0.19 0.13
Training * Tenure 1 0.01 0.05
Firm age
less than 2 years 0.02 0.15
2-5y e a r s 0.05 0.22
Firm size
5 0 0-9 9 9e m p l o y e e s 0.07 0.27
1000 employees or more 0.06 0.23
Worker age
25 - 44 years 0.57 0.11
45 - 64 years 0.26 0.16
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics
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